Constitutional Law -- Wyman v. James: The Fourth Amendment in The Balance by Hodges, George R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 50 | Number 3 Article 11
4-1-1972
Constitutional Law -- Wyman v. James: The Fourth
Amendment in The Balance
George R. Hodges
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
George R. Hodges, Constitutional Law -- Wyman v. James: The Fourth Amendment in The Balance, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 682 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol50/iss3/11
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Wyman v. James: The Fourth Amendment in The
Balance
Throughout American history the fourth amendment' has stood as
the basic safeguard of the privacy and security of individuals in our free
society against arbitrary invasions by agents of the national govern-
ment. Because this protection is implicit in the "concept of ordered
liberty, ' 2 its explicit terms were held applicable through the fourteenth
amendment to acts of state officials as well.3 The fourth amendment
has been applied in three distinct situations: (1) traditional criminal
cases,4 (2) civil forfeiture cases,5 and (3) criminal actions for refusal to
permit an administrative investigation.6 Recently, in Wyman v. James,7
the Supreme Court eschewed the opportunity to enlarge this third cate-
gory to include non-criminal state sanctions for an individual's refusal
to consent to administrative intrusions into his home.
In May, 1967, shortly before her son was born, Barbara James
applied for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),' and
after a caseworker visited her in her apartment, assistance was author-
ized. Two years later, upon being notified that a caseworker would again
visit her home, Mrs. James refused to permit the visit, offering instead
to meet elsewhere to give all pertinent information. She was warned that
her refusal would, under the New York welfare laws,9 result in termina-
tion of the assistance, but permission to visit was still denied. Assistance
was terminated after a Department of Social Services hearing, but Mrs.
James sought and received a temporary restraining order 0 and, later, a
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
3Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
exclusionary rule was also held to be applicable to the states.
'E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
5Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Because of their quasi-criminal nature civil
forfeiture cases have been treated as criminal cases and, therefore, this category will not be
separately discussed.
'Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7400 U.S. 309 (1971).
8AFDC is embodied in Social Security Act §§ 401-10,42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970); N.Y. Soc.
WELFARE LAW, § 343-62 (McKinney 1966) (now N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW).
'N.Y. Soc. WELFARE Law § 134 (McKinney 1966) (now N.Y. Soc. SERVCas LAw).
1"James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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permanent injunction from a divided three-judge district court." On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the
authorized home visit was not a search,' 12 and even if it were it would
not be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
3
This note will examine the Court's latter determination 4 after first
developing general fourth amendment theory, especially in the realm of
the administrative search.
For analytical purposes, the fourth amendment has frequently been
broken down into two clauses: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the requirement of a warrant based on proba-
ble cause. 5 The Supreme Court has debated for some years the relation-
ship between the clauses. One position is that the warrant clause states
an independent constitutional requirement that "law enforcement
agents must secure and use a search warrant whenever reasonably prac-
ticable"; 6 the other is that the existence of a search warrant is only one
factor among many to be considered in assessing whether the search in
question was reasonable. 17 In recent years the trend has been in the
direction of requiring a warrant, so that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are un-
reasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' 8 Searches have
been exempted from warrant requirements when they are (1) of vehi-
cles,'" (2) to prevent destruction of the evidence, such as taking a blood
sample from a man suspected of drunken driving,20 (3) in hot pursuit of
a suspected criminal,2' (4) incident to a lawful arrest, 22 (5) at interna-
"James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
2400 U.S. at 317.
'11d. at 318.
"This note will not discuss whether the authorized visit constituted a "search," id. at 317, and
whether the required termination of assistance for refusal to permit a home visit was an unconstitu-
tional condition, id. at 326-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The reader should note that the precise
holding of James is that the home visit does not constitute a "search", id. at 317-18, and therefore,
the point this note explores is technically dictum. Because it is felt that the major importance of
the case lies in its importation of the balancing technique into fourth amendment analysis, the scope
of this note is limited to that point.
"See note 1 supra.
"6Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). This case was overruled in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950).
"United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
"8Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
0Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966).
2"Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). But see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
19721
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tional borders,"' and (6) of those suspected of criminal conduct for the
protection of the police officer ("stop and frisk" situations)."
In 1967 the Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court,2"
brought the area of administrative code enforcement inspections
involving criminal sanctions for refusal of permission to inspect under
the warrant requirement, but reduced the standard of probable cause to
something less than that required in a criminal case. The Court held that
area inspections were reasonable when the need to search outweighed
the invasion the search entailed, but whenever he owner of a particular
dwelling would not consent to the inspection, a warrant must be ob-
tained to enter the premises .2 The Court noted that "the warrant proce-
dure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property
is justified by a reasonable governmental interest, ' 27 by requiring a prior
determination of reasonableness rather than post hoc judicial review.
Although Camara would seem to control James, the Court distin-
guished Camara on the ground that Mrs. James had not been subjected
to criminal prosecution for denying the visit and, in fact, no criminal
prosecution was even authorized. 8 The James case presented four alter-
native resolutions for the Court: (1) that mere time and place notice
satisfied the'reasonableness test, (2) that closely regulated inspections
are reasonable, (3) that a warrant is required, but on a lesser standard
of probable cause, or (4) that a warrant obtained on a traditional show-
ing of probable cause is required. Of these, the Court chose the second
alternative and thereby created another exception to the warrant re-
quirement.
The reasoning behind this choice is significant because it is some-
what foreign to traditional fourth amendment analysis. By creating the
(1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
2Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
"Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (dictum).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
-387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had
held, based bn the reasonableness clause, that so long as administrative investigations were statuto-
rily limited as to time and manner, they were not unreasonable. The Court in Frank had reasoned
that of the two interests it found protected by the fourth amendment-privacy and self-
protection-the latter was more intense, thus making the reach of the fourth amendment depend,
to a large extent on whether the search was part of a criminal investigation.
26In a companion case to. Camara, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court
applied the same rationale to administrative searches of business premises.
"387 U.S. at 539.
1400 U.S. at 325. Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that there should be no such
distinction. Id. at 340-41.
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new exception the Court, in its determination of the reasonableness of
the "visit" in James, eliminated both the need for a warrant and the
necessity of probable cause to search. This has been before only in the
border search29 and "stop and frisk"30 exceptions. Since the enactment
of the first border search statute in 1789,11 customs officers have been
authorized to carry out such searches on the mere suspicion that illegal
or dutiable goods are being concealed. The basis of this exemption is
threefold. First, this type of search historically has not been considered
to be controlled by the fourth amendment because the first border
search statute was enacted by the same Congress that proposed the Bill
of Rights.3 1 Secondly, the occasion for the search arises quickly.
Thirdly, there is a strong national interest in prevention of smuggling,
especially of narcotics.3 3 Terry v. Ohio34 eliminated the need for either
a warrant or probable cause in police "stop and frisk" encounters with
individuals who may be armed and dangerous on the ground that such
police conduct as a practical matter could not be subjected to the war-
rant procedure. In that situation the exclusionary rule is ineffective
because the police are not interested in prosecuting or are willing to
forego successful prosecution to achieve some other goal such as self-
protection.35 Welfare "visits," however, would not seem to qualify for
exception from warrant and probable cause requirements on any of the
above bases, and other reasons which can support such an exception are
insubstantial. The governmental interest in the administration of AFDC
is not as important as the national interest in stemming the international
narcotics traffic as in border searches; the occasion for the search does
not arise quickly as in border searches or "stop and frisk" situations;
and, unlike the "stop and frisk" situation, the warrant procedure would
be effective to prevent unjustified invasions of the homes of welfare
recipients because the caseworker has no "other goals" to further by an
unwarranted "visit." Thus the Court in James has made a significant
departure from past fourth amendment analysis.
The most important aspect of this departure is the Court's use of
"balancing of interests" to determine the reasonableness of the "visit."
2Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (dictum).
-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (1789).
3'Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
3Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1011-12
(1968).
-392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"Id. at 14.
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Camara introduced balancing in the area of administrative inspections.
Though the warrant clause was clearly at issue there, the Court said that
the reasonableness of the inspection was to be determined by "balancing
he need to search against the invasion the search entails."3 Terry
adopted the Camara balancing test, holding that the governmental in-
terests in effective prevention and detection of crime and protection of
the officer in the street outweighed the brief, limited intrusion upon
individual rights, and therefore, the protective pat-down for weapons
was reasonable.' The Court in James cited Terry for the propositions
that reasonableness is the fourth amendment's standard and that its
specific content is to be determined by the particular context in which
it is asserted.38 The Court concluded that the governmental interests in
aiding dependent children, fulfilling the public trust, and administering
AFDC outweighed the limited intrusion upon Mrs. James' right of
privacy.3
9
The Court apparently borrowed its technique of balancing from a
line of first amendment cases. When the balancing test is applied in the
first amendment area it introduces substantial flexibility into interpreta-
tion of the amendment; the result of the balancing process depends on
what factors are fed into the "balance." For example, in Barenblatt v.
United States0 where a witness before a Congressional investigation
refused to answer questions concerning his political activities, the ma-
jority of the Court weighed broadly defined governmental inter-
ests-society's interest in preservation of the government and having
well informed lawmakers-against the narrowly defined individual in-
terest of the witness in refraining from revealing his political affiliations
and found the balance in favor of the government. Mr. Justice Black,
in his dissenting opinion, defined the individual interest more broadly,
as being the interest of society as a whole in being able to join organiza-
tions and advocate causes free from fear of governmental penalties, and
reached a conclusion opposite that of the majority of the Court.
In James, as in the first amendment cases, the balance came out
in favor of the state largely because the state interest was defined
broadly while the individual interest was defined narrowly. On the
11387 U.S. at 537.
11392 U.S. at 21-27.
'400 U.S. at 318.
311d. at 326.
40360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo,
366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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state's side of the balance was placed the alleged necessity of the home
visit as an administrative tool to assure the fulfillment of the public's
interest in aiding dependent children, to carry out the public trust, and
to know that its tax funds are properly expended." Against this the
Court weighed not the social interest in protecting homes from unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy, but Mrs. James' personal interest in the
privacy of her own home from the prearranged welfare visit.
42
The Court's weighing of interests becomes even more questionable
upon a closer investigation of the alleged necessity of the home visit. No
statutory requirement for home visits exists. 3 The federal regulations
require only a periodic redetermination of eligibility,44 with field investi-
gations required only in a selected sample of cases.4 5 Even if one assumes
authority for the procedure, it is difficult to see what would be accom-
plished by a home visit. The child does not have to be present when the
caseworker visits,4 and, when a school-age child is involved, it is un-
likely that he would be present. There is no need to visit to see if there
is a man in the house since the presence of a "substitute father"-one
cohabiting with the mother, but owing no duty of support to the
child-has been held to be immaterial in establishing eligibility for
AFDC." Moreover, a congressional committee has found that the home
visit is ineffective as a means of veryfying eligibility," while it has been
reported that the incidence of ineligibility has not increased when the
affidavit system is used. 9 It should also be noted that the public interest
in aiding dependent children is undercut by termination of all AFDC
4'400 U.S. at 318-24.
411d. at 321-22.
111d. at 319 n.6; id. at 34547 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In other areas of social welfare law,
state regulations authorizing termination of AFDC benefits because of the mother's refusal to
cooperate have been struck down as impositions of additional conditions on eligibility not required
by the Social Security Act. See Weaver v. Doe, 92 S.Ct. 537, affg mem. Doe v. Swank, 332 F.
Supp. 61 (N.D. III. 1971). (mother required to name putative father and aid in obtaining child
support); Carleson v. Taylor, 92 S. Ct. 446, affg mem. Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (mother required to sign criminal non-support claim against absent father); Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (mother
required to name father of illegitimate children).
11400 U.S. at 319, 342.
11400 U.S. at 319 n.6.
"Brief for Social Service Employees' Union Local 371 as Amicus Curiae at 4, Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
"Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1970).
"Brief for Social Service Employees' Union Local 371 as Amicus Curiae at 8-13, Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
"Id. at 12.
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benefits to the child as the state did in James.
Ad hoc balancing as practiced in James enables the Court to make
any determination it wishes without regard for consistency and without
any assurance of impartiality.50 Thus the use of balancing in the James
category of cases, if applied to the fourth amendment generally, would
pose a serious threat to the substantive rules governing police conduct
that have evolved in the traditional criminal cases as protections of an
individual's privacy. If balancing is to be used in the fourth amendment
area, the Court should not follow the first amendment technique, but
should strive for a proper balance by only weighing interests of the same
level.51 A proper balancing of the interests in James would weigh only
particular interests in a specific situation: the state's need to go into the
home of a welfare recipient to verify eligibility when the recipient has
agreed to furnish all relevant information elsewhere against the particu-
lar individual's interest in not being bothered by the type of invasion of
hr privacy that a home visit would entail.
Even if proper balancing techniques are used, an individual's fourth
amendment right to privacy from governmental intrusion should not be
diluted through the balancing of competing interests. In an era of in-
creasing government paternalism, protection of an individual's privacy
can only be assured through the traditional warrant procedure.12 This
is especially true in personalized welfare administration as opposed to
impersonal area inspections for the enforcement of municipal codes.
The restrictions of the traditional probable cause standard in area hous-
ing inspections are not present in a case such as James where the case-
worker makes a visit to a specific home. Moreover, because one purpose
of a home visit is to guard against violations of the welfare code and
child abuse, both of which are felonies, no less than full probable
cause to search should be tolerated. One must consider the ease with
OSee M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 161-62 (1966); Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440.48 (1962).
StM. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 83-84 (1966). Balancing of interests seems to be derived
from Roscoe Pound's theories of social engineering which reasoned that all public or social inter-
ests are actually individual interests viewed from different perspectives for purposes of clarity.
Therefore, if the system is to work, balances must be struck only by weighing carefully labelled
claims of the same level (i.e. social interests v. social interests, not social interests v. individual
interests). Id.
52See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See
Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37, for a discussion of the inadequacies of the area probable cause
warrant procedure.
53400 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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which the warrant procedure could be carried out. If the recipient re-
fuses to consent upon notice of an upcoming visit, application for a
warrant could be made. If the caseworker could articulate facts that
suggested that violations or child abuse had been committed the warrant
would issue. If not, the home visit would not be necessary. In short, the
decision should be for an impartial magistrate, not for the caseworker
in the field.
GEORGE R. HODGES
Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenantst
A restrictive covenant in an employment contract which unduly
restricts the covenantor will be closely scrutinized by the courts because
it violates the public policy against restraint of trade. According to the
traditional view as stated in the Restatement of Contracts,' if the cove-
nant can be construed to be reasonable it will stand but if not2 it falls;
to do otherwise would be to rewrite the contract for the parties. In
Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co.3 the Supreme Court of Iowa has over-
ruled prior cases based on the Restatement rule and joined the growing
minority of states which have adopted the "partial-enforcement" doc-
trine long advocated by Professors Williston4 and Corbin..
The plaintiff in Ehlers, a former employee of the defendant truck
rental company, sought a declaratory judgment that two restrictive cov-
enants in his employment contract with the defendant were unreasona-
bly broad. The company counterclaimed for an injunction against viola-
tThe following closely related materials have appeared in this Review: Note, Covenants Not
To Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960); Note, Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment
Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United States, 49 N.C.L. REv. 393 (1971); 26 N.C.L.
REv. 402 (1948).
'Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it a
promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire
agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise
indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal and not
enforceable even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
'See RESTATEMENT § 515.
3  Iowa - , 188 N.W.2d 368 (1971).
'S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
16A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
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